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I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to his elevation to Chief Justice of the United States in 1986,
Associate Justice William Hubbs Rehnquist was not often viewed as a
champion of the First Amendment. He had, in fact, authored or joined in
Supreme Court opinions having the effect of limiting free
speech.' Generally, in clashes between government power and individual
rights, Justice Rehnquist was among the Justices most consistently siding
with the former.2 Aggravating the matter, the Justice whose title Rehnquist
1. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985); FCC
v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983);
Board of Ed., Island Trees Free Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); Hutchinson v. Proxmire,
443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mn.
Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orioto, 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
2. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649 (1984); Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981);
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Vance v. Bradley, 440
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was to assume, Warren E. Burger, had written or joined a number of
important First Amendment opinions3 broadly interpreting the constitutional
right to freedom of speech and of the press during his career as Chief
Justice.4 Was the First Amendment in for an overhaul in the new "Rehnquist
Court?"
Because the vote of the Chief Justice counts no more than the vote of
any other Justice, it is unrealistic to assume that Rehnquist, even if he
wanted to as the new Chief, could steer the Supreme Court in any given
direction on any given issue. But Rehnquist became Chief Justice at a time
when the Court was in transition. Additionally, other personnel changes in
the Court did not seem to bode well for free speech advocates. Justice Potter
Stewart, one of the Court's legendary First Amendment champions, had left
the bench five years earlier to be replaced by Justice Sandra O'Connor, who
would be less passionate about First Amendment freedoms. The retiring
Justice Warren Burger was replaced by Antonin Scalia in 1986; Justice
Lewis Powell would soon be replaced by Anthony Kennedy in 1988; Justice
William Brennan by David Souter in 1990; Justice Thurgood Marshall by
Clarence Thomas in 1991; Justice Byron White by Ruth Bader Ginsburg in
1993; and Justice Harry Blackmun by Stephen Breyer in 1994. With the
single exception of Justice White5 being replaced by Ruth Ginsburg, each
U.S. 93 (1979); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fronterio v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
3. See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,
427 U.S. 539 (1976); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
4. Notwithstanding his appreciation for First Amendment interests, former Chief Justice
Burger was notorious for his clashes with news reporters. See Nina Totenberg & Fred
Barbash, BurgerLoved The Law But Not The Hassle, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at COI.
5. During his tenure on the Court, Justice Byron White was considered somewhat
antagonistic to the news media. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979) (holding
that it does not violate freedom of the press to allow libel plaintiffs to inquire into journalists'
"editorial thought processes"); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 567-68 (1978)
(holding that newsrooms are not exempt from police searches, irrespective of whether anyone
in the newsroom is suspected of wrongdoing, provided requirements for search warrant are
met, but Justice White was mixed on issues of free speech generally); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 679-80 (1972) (holding that journalists have no First Amendment right to refuse to
testify before a grand jury about information obtained from confidential sources). See, e.g.,
Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560 (1991); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364
(1984); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 282
(1982) (White, J., dissenting) (favoring limitations); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980)
(supporting free speech); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427
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Justice was at least "perceived" to have been succeeded by a Justice less
sympathetic to First Amendment values.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that early apprehensions of
the Court were unjustified and to show how the Rehnquist Court today holds
steady in its solicitude for freedom of speech. As are the cases before it, the
Rehnquist court is surely different from the predecessor Burger Court. But
on the tough, politically charged, and socially sensitive issues, the Rehnquist
Court has shown impressive allegiance to First Amendment principles.
While this article focuses mainly on issues of freedom of speech, it is the
writer's view that the same allegiance can be found in 6the Rehnquist Court's
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

U.S. 347 (1976); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding the FCC's
subsequently abandoned "fairness doctrine" requiring radio and television stations to air both
sides 6f important issues).
6. It is true that the Court has allowed greater accommodation of religion by the state.
See Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2018-19 (1997) (allowing public school teachers to
teach remedial courses in parochial schools); Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 837
(1995) (requiring a state university to provide religious publication the same financial support
accorded other student publications); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384 (1993) (requiring a school system to provide equal access for religious activities); Board
of Educ. of Westside Comm. Sch. v. Mergans, 496 U.S. 226, 247 (1990) (requiring school
systems to provide religious groups the same access accorded nonreligious groups); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993) (finding no Establishment Clause
violation in the state providing sign language interpreters for hearing impaired students in
church run schools); But by and large, the Court has maintained a tradition of separation of
church and state. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (finding an
Establishment Clause violation in allowing members of the clergy to offer invocations or
benedictions at public school commencement ceremonies); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel
Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 730 (1994) (creating a public school district to
specifically accommodate disabled children of orthodox religious sect violates the
Establishment Clause); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 547 (1993) (invalidating municipal ordinance against animal sacrifice on Free
Exercise grounds). The Court's general adherence to precedent in the above cases is
remarkable given the widely acknowledged dissatisfaction by a majority of the current Justices
with the still controlling "Lemon Test." See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192
(1973). "Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment
Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school attorneys." Lamb's
Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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I. THE CONFLICT

Freedom of speech is as fundamental a value of American culture as it
is of constitutional law. Like motherhood and apple pie, it cannot be
challenged or threatened in the abstract. It never is. The most serious
challenges and threats to free speech always occur when it must be balanced
against other cherished values, such as protecting the American flag or
insulating children from the evils of pornography and indecency. Is speech
still to be deemed "free" when invoked as a weapon of racial hatred?
If the First Amendment protects the most desirable speech, it must also
protect that which is least desirable or its guarantees would be meaningless.
In the last decade, the Rehnquist Court was faced with balancing free speech
against all of these other important, rival interests noted above and, in each
case, free speech prevailed.
JR. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND FLAG DESECRATION
Few issues have given the Court more difficulty than deciding whether
desecration of the American flag is protected by the First Amendment. The
First Amendment literally forbids the abridgment only of "speech," but the
Court has long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or
written word.
The Court has acknowledged that "conduct" may be
"sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 8 In United States v.
O'Brien,9 the Burger Court had previously held that incidental limitations on
expressive conduct, such as burning one's draft card, could be punished if
doing so served an important governmental interest unrelated to suppression
of expression.10
The Court's first opportunity to apply the O'Brien decision to the issue
of flag desecration arose out of a political demonstration during the 1984
Republican National Convention to protest the policies of the Reagan
administration. After a march through the streets of Dallas, Gregory Johnson
burned an American flag while protesters chanted." No one was physically
injured or threatened with injury, although several witnesses were seriously

7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
8. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
9. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

10. Id. at 377.
11. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 399.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol22/iss3/6

4

O'Brien: The Rehnquist Court: Holding Steady on Freedom of Speech

O'Brien

19981

offended by the flag burning.12 Johnson was 13
convicted of desecration of a
venerated object in violation of a Texas statute.
Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the
Republican National Convention, there was never much question that
Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct. The Court
invalidated Johnson's conviction, finding that it was directly related to the
suppression of expression.15 Justice Brennan, for the Court, wrote: "If there
is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." 16
Justice Brennan was, in his day, the Court's premier liberal advocate
and frequently its most articulate proponent of free speech. Accordingly, in
Johnson, he waxed eloquent:
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag
than waving one's own, no better way to counter a flag burner's
message than by saluting the flag that bums, no surer means of
preserving the dignity even of the flag that burned than by-as one
witness here did-according its remains a respectful burial. We do
not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for in doing so
we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents.17
The majority opinion in Johnson drew some bitter, and equally forceful,
dissents. s Chief Justice Rehnquist: "The government may conscript men
into the Armed Forces where they must fight and perhaps die for the flag,
but the government may not prohibit the public burning of the banner under
which they fight. I would uphold the Texas statute as applied in this case." 19
Justice Stevens, dissenting separately, stated:
The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in
motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and
Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T.
Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the
soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are

12. Id.
13. Id. at 400 (citing 'lEx.PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (1989)).
14. Id. at 400-02.

15. Id. at 399.
16. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
17. Id. at 420.
18. Id. at 421.
19. Id. at 435 (White & O'Connor, RI., joining in dissenting opinion).
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worth fighting for-and our history demonstrates that they are-it
cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power
is
20
not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration.
But perhaps the most intriguing, and to some surprising, opinion was
authored by Justice Anthony Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote
for the majority:
The hard fact is that sometimes we must make decisions we do
not like. We make them because they are right, right in the sense
that the law and the Constitution, as we see them, compel the
result. And so great is our commitment to the process that, except
in the rare case, we do not pause to express distaste for the result,
perhaps for fear of undermining a valued principle that dictates the
decision. This is one of those rare cases ....

•.. I do not believe the Constitution gives us the right to rule as
the dissenting Members of the Court urge, however painful this
judgment is to announce. Though symbols often are what we
ourselves make of them, the flag is constant in expressing beliefs
Americans share, beliefs in law and peace and that freedom which
sustains the human spirit. The case here today forces recognition
of the costs to which those beliefs commit us. It is poignant but
21
fundamental that the flag protects those who hold it in contempt.
Kennedy's opinion was particularly curious in that he was a Reagan
appointee who many anticipated would embrace the Reagan Justice
Department's view that flag burning is not within free speech
protection. Kennedy was the third choice for the seat vacated by retiring
Justice Lewis Powell. President Reagan's first choice was Robert Bork, who
has written critically of the Johnson decision 22 and who, if confirmed,
presumably would have provided the fifth vote to uphold Johnson's
conviction and the Texas law.23

20. Id. at 439.
21. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 420-21.
22. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING ToWARDs GOMoRRAH: MODERN LIBERAUSM AND

AMERICAN DECLINE 99-101 (1996).
23. Much to the dismay of many conservative Republicans and the Justice Department
of the Bush administration, Justice Kennedy not only provided the crucial fifth vote but wrote
the decision of the Court in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992) (rejecting the Bush
Administration's position that brief religious ceremonies at public school commencement
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Public outrage over the outcome in Johnson was so intense and negative
that, within four months of the Court's decision, Congress passed the Flag
Protection Act of 198924 making it a "federal" crime, punishable by up to a
year in prison, for anyone who "knowingly mutilates, defaces, physically
defiles, bums, maintains on the floor or ground, or tramples upon any flag of
the United States."' It would not take long for challenges to the new federal
law to reach the Supreme Court, with the Bush administration urging that
Johnson be reconsidered.26 If the Court were to decline the invitation, the
Administration argued that the Johnson decision did not foreclose the
validity of the Flag Protection Act of 1989 in light of Congress' considered
legislative judgment that there is a compelling national interest in protecting
the flag.27 The Court has, in the past, held that Congress has greater
authority to define the national interest than any state.28 But the Court still
declined the invitation to reconsider Johnson and rejected the
Administration's constitutional arguments on the merits. 29 The vote was
identical to that in Johnson,
5-4, with Justice Brennan again writing the
30
decision for the Court.
IV. FREEDOM OF SPEECH, INDECENCY, AND PORNOGRAPHY

In 1979, the Burger Court emphatically recognized society's interest in
protecting children from indecency and pornography in Federal
Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, often referred to as
"The Seven Dirty Words Case." The Court also noted special hazards posed

ceremonies do not violate the Establishment Clause). Kennedy also provided the fifth vote in
PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), which reaffirmed Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113 (1973). Both decisions have been sharply criticized by Robert Bork in

SLoucHING

TowARDs GOMORRAH. See BoRK, supra note 22. Had Bork been confirmed as a Supreme

Court Justice, he likely would have cast the pivotal votes to turn the Court around.
I
24. 18 U.S.C. § 700 (1994) (originally enacted as Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-131, §§ 2-3, 103 Stat. 777(1989)).
25. Id. § 700 (a)(1).
26. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
27. Brief for the United States, United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (No. 891433); Brief for the United States, United States v. Haggerty, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (No. 891434).
28. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 496 (1980) (upholding federal set-aside
program for minority contractors); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486
(1989) (rejecting set-aside program for minority contractors adopted by municipality).
29. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 312.

30. Id.
31. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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by broadcasting that would resonate through later cases, including a
landmark decision a generation later involving indecency on the Internet.3
At issue in Pacifica was a federal regulation 33 which prohibited the use
of "indecent or profane language by means of radio communications. ' 34 A
radio station owned by the Pacifica Foundation made an afternoon broadcast
of a satiric monologue, entitled "Filthy Words," which listed and repeated a
variety of colloquial uses of "words you couldn't say on the public...
airwaves.,, 35 The Federal Communication Committee ("FCC") found that
language in the monologue depicted sexual and excretory activities in a
particularly offensive manner, and noted that they were broadcast in the
early afternoon "when children are undoubtedly in the audience."' 36 The
FCC concluded that the language as broadcast was indecent and could be
prohibited.37
Pacifica challenged the application of the FCC regulation to its
38
broadcast as a violation of free speech but lost, 5-4, in the Supreme Court.
Justice John Paul Stevens, for the Court, wrote: "[O]f all forms of
communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First
Amendment protection;" 39 a result Justice Stevens justified, in part, by
noting that radio broadcasts extend into "the privacy of the home," where
they are "uniquely accessible to children." 4 Of the five Justices in the
majority, only Justices Rehnquist and Stevens remain on the Court. All four
dissenters, however, have now left the Court. The Burger Court's resolution
of the Pacifica case would seem to have created a framework for further
regulation of electronic broadcasting by the subsequent, and decidedly more
conservative, Rehnquist Court. However, that was not to be the case.
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,4 1 the new
Rehnquist Court was confronted with a question raising issues that seemed
identical to those in Pacifica.42 If Congress could prohibit or restrict the
transmission of indecent radio broadcasts in the interest of protecting
children, could it do the same when the transmission is of indecent interstate

32. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1973).
34. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 731.

35. Id. at 729.
36. Id. at 732.

37. Id.
38. Id.at751.
39. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 748.

40. Id. at 748-49.
41. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
42. Id.at 117-19.
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commercial telephone messages, commonly known as "dial-a-porn?" 43
Relying on the Court's decision in Pacifica, the Justice Department argued
in the affirmative. 4 However, dividing 6-3, the Rehnquist Court found in
the negative.4 5
The Court noted that "dial-a-porn" had become big business, 4 and in
New York City alone, the "dial-a-por" service "received six to seven
million calls a month for the 6-month period ending in April 1985." 47 And
much like the indecent broadcasts at issue in Pacifica,"dial-a-porn" services
were also accessible, although not perhaps as accessible, to children in the
privacy of the home. 48 The Court acknowledged that the government had a
"compelling interest of preventing minors from being exposed to indecent
telephone messages," 49 but in this case Congress had gone too far, and its
ban had "the invalid effect of limiting the content of adult telephone
conversations to that which is suitable for children to hear. It is another case
of 'burn[ing] the house to roast the pig."'5 0
There is no doubt that the government could not proscribe the indecent,
although non-obscene, telephone messages in Sable from being printed in a
newspaper, 51 and Pacifica indicated the messages could be banned from
radio and, presumably, television broadcasts.52 In 1997, the question arose
as to how the Court should view "indecent" communications on the
Internet. 3 The Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA") 54 made it a
crime to display "indecent" material online in a manner that might make it
available to minors.55 Key portions of the law had been found to violate free
speech by a special three judge district court.5 6 By the time the case reached
the Rehnquist Court, there seemed to be a growing consensus that the
43. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1988). "The statute, as amended in 1988, imposed an outright
ban on indecent as well as obscene interstate commercial telephone messages." Sable, 492
U.S. at 117.

44. Id. at 127.
45. Id. at 131.
46. Id. at 120 n.3 (citing Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 848 (2d

Cir. 1986)).
47. Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Sable, 492 U.S. at 127-28.
Id. at 131.
Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476

(1957).
52. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 738.
53. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2334 (1997).
54. 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)(1)(B)-(2), (d)(1)(2).

55. Id.
56. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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Justices would also find the provisions unconstitutional.57 But what would
be the basis of such a ruling? How would the Internet be viewed; what
"test" would the Court apply to cyberspace speech; and should the Court
treat it as it treated broadcasting in Pacifica? It has been argued that if there
ever were a place "uniquely accessible to children" 58 in the privacy of the
home, it would be cyberspace.5 9 But unlike radio and television, indecent
online messages are not likely to be found by accident or by merely changing
stations. They must be intentionally sought, as might sexually explicit
messages available through "dial-a-porn." 6 Would that not make Sable the
more applicable precedent?
In what has been called "the legal birth certificate of the Internet,"' the
Rehnquist Court, in a sweeping ruling, found cyberspace entitled to6freater
The
protection than either broadcasting or telephone communications.
Court struck down the CDA regulations as "content-based" and therefore
subject to the most rigorous scrutiny.63 The Justices were unanimous in the
result, differing only on the scope of relief,64 with Justice Stevens writing for
a seven Justice majority: "The interest in encouraging freedom of
expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven
benefit of censorship. 65
The Court flatly rejected comparisons between the Internet and
broadcasting, finding the latter considerably more accessible and intrusive,
and thus more subject to regulation. 66 Veteran court watcher and author,
Stephen J. Wermiel, called the decision an "intrepid First Amendment step
into cyberspace" with a message that was "loud and clear that the Court
as a new forum for the open exchange of ideas and
views the Internet
67
information."

57. John M. Broder, White House Is Set to Ease Its Stance on Internet Smut, N.Y.
TIMES, June,16, 1997, at 3A.
58. Pacifica,438 U.S. at 749.
59. See generally Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
60. Sable, 492 U.S. 115.
61. Edward Felsenthal & Jared Sandberg, High Court Strikes Down InternetSmut Law,
WALL ST. J.,
June 27, 1997, at BI (quoting Bruce Ennis). Bruce Ennis argued the case in the
Supreme Court on behalf of a coalition of civil rights and other groups opposed to the
Communication Decency Act of 1996. Id.
62. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351.
63. Id. at 2348.
64. Id. at 2351.

65. Id.
66. Id. at 2342.
67. Stephen Wermiel, "Let Them Talk Among Themselves," LEGAL TIMEs, July 14,
1997, at S46.
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The Court, however, has neither been free of concerns about indecency
nor entertained doubts about the right of democratically elected
representatives to address its perceived harms through appropriate
legislation. One of the more interesting and amusing, yet important,
confrontations in this area came before the Rehnquist Court in Barnes v.
Glen Theater,Inc. 68 The case involved a South Bend, Indiana night club, the
Kitty Kat Lounge, and two of its employees, all of whom wanted to provide
"totally nude dancing" as entertainment.69 These parties claimed that the
state's public indecency law, which requires dancers to wear at least pasties
and a G-string, violates their First Amendment right to freedom of
expression. 70

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sharply
divided en banc and sided with the plaintiffs by ruling that nonobscene nude
dancing performed for entertainment is protected expression and that the
state law was an improper infringement on that activity "because its purpose
was to prevent
the message of eroticism and sexuality conveyed by the
71
dancers."
Dividing 5-4, the Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit en

banc. 72 In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that totally

nude dancing is "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First
Amendment 7 3 but, citing the four-part "O'Brien test," 74 concluded that the,

68. 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
69. Id. at 563.
70. Id. at 564.
71. Id. at 565 (citing Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.
1990)). The decision of the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Richard Posner, and the dissent, per
Judge Frank Easterbrook, provide powerful and enlightening, but sharply opposing,
viewpoints of the history and scope of freedom of expression embodied in the First
Amendment. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089, 1120 (7th Cir. 1990).
Could nude dancing and its "message of 'eroticism"' have been what the framers had
contemplated protecting in drafting the First Amendment? Id. at 1118. The appeals court's
conflicting rationales are highly recommended for an extensive explanation of these topics.
72. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 565.
73. Id. at 566.
74. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Court found that a government
regulation is:
[S]ufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 376-77. O'Brien burned his draft card on the steps of the South Boston courthouse in
the presence of a sizable crowd; he was convicted of violating a statute that prohibited the
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statute is justified despite "its incidental limitations on some expressive
activity. 7 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that "the statute's purpose of
protecting societal order and morality is clear from its text and history" and
that the law "reflect[s] moral disapproval of people appearing in the nude
among strangers in public places;" that it "furthers a substantial government
interest in protecting order and morality; '76 and "is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression."77
V. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND RACIALLY MOTIVATED HATE CRIMES

How to grapple with lingering racial hostilities in the United States has
long been an issue that has divided the country. The issue generated
remarkable division in the Supreme Court in 1992, when the Justices agreed
to decide the constitutionality of a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance-similar to
ordinances in many cities and laws in forty states-that prohibited "hate
crimes. ' 8 The ordinance defined "hate crimes" as the display of a symbol
which one knows or has reason to know "arouses anger, alarm or resentment
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 79 In R.A. V. v.
City of St. Paul, Minnesota,80 the ordinance was being applied for the first
time against seventeen-year-old Robert A. Viktora, who had been accused of
burning a cross on the front lawn of an African-American family that had
just moved into the neighborhood. Viktora challenged the ordinance as a
violation of free speech. 2 In a 9-0 decision, the Justices agreed for sharply
different reasons,3 revealing a deep philosophical divide on the Court over
the scope of free speech and the meaning of the Court's own First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Justice Scalia, writing for the five Justices in the majority, 4 said
although the cross burning was "reprehensible," the St. Paul ordinance
violated free speech, and therefore Viktora could not be prosecuted under an

knowing destruction or mutilation of such a card. Id. at 369. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Id. at 377.
75. Barnes,501 U.S. at 567.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Id. at 568-70.
78. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
79. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., CRIMNAL ORDINANCE CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
80. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
81. Id. at 379-80.
82. Id. at 380.
83. Id. at 381.
84. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas joined the
majority opinion.
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unconstitutional statute.85 To Justice Scalia, it was as if a city council,
having the authority to ban obscenity, chose to enact an ordinance
prohibiting only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the
city government.8 6 "Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility that the
city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas."8 7 The St. Paul
ordinance, concluded Scalia, fostered an unconstitutional88 content-based
discrimination "silencing speech on the basis of its content."
The Supreme Court of Minnesota sought to save the ordinance by
giving it the most narrow construction, 9 concluding that it only reached
those expressions that constitute "fighting words" within the meaning of
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,90 which have no First Amendment protection
and which the state has the power to proscribe. 91 But Justice Scalia, for the
Court, said St. Paul had erred in singling out certain kinds of "fighting
words" for special condemnation. 92 The ordinance imposed special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on the "disfavored
subjects" of race, color, creed, religion, or gender while at the same time the
ordinance permitted displays containing abusive invective as long as they
were not addressed to those topics. 93 In addition to "content discrimination,"
Justice Scalia went on to find that the St. Paul ordinance also amounted to
unconstitutional "viewpoint discrimination" in that displays containing
"fighting words" that do not relate to race, color, creed, or gender would
seemingly be useable by those arguing in favor of racial tolerance and
equality but not by their opponents.9 4 "St. Paul has no such authority to
license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensbery rules."9 5
Seldom in the Court's history has a majority opinion evoked such
vitriol in a concurring opinion, from Justices who agreed with the result but

85. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 396.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 394.
88. Id. at 392.
89. Id. at 385. It is settled that the United States Supreme Court is bound by the
construction given a state law or municipal ordinance by that state's highest court. Posadas de
P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 339 (1986); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.

747,769 n.24 (1982).
90. 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (holding that "fighting words" have no First Amendment

protection).
91. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.

Published by NSUWorks, 1998

13

Nova Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1998], Art. 6

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 22:711

disagreed with how the Court's majority had reached the decision. 96 Justice
White, writing for the concurrence 97 dismissed the Court's opinion as "arid
and folly" and "transparently wrong., 98 Where Justice Scalia seemed to
view the ordinance as underinclusive, allowing offensive speech on some
issues but not others, Justice White viewed the problem as one of
overbreadth, allowing criminal penalties not only for unprotected expression
but for expression protected by the First Amendment as well. 99 To Justice
White, the problem was that speech or expressive activity that merely
"causes hurt feeling, offense, or resentment" is nonetheless protected by the
First Amendment.' w St. Paul's proscription of such speech was thus "fatally
overbroad and invalid on its face."''1 1 In the view of Justice White and the
three other Justices who joined his opinion, a more carefully drafted law
with the same end but directed only at "fighting words" rather than words
that are merely obnoxious, insulting, or otherwise offensive, would face no
First Amendment obstacle.10 2
Yet to the many civil rights groups that had urged the Court to uphold
the St. Paul ordinance,10 3 it was not the Court's hotly disputed reasoning but
the result of the unanimous decision that was most worrisome. The decision
had placed a constitutional cloud over another popular legislative approach
to the hate crime issue: punishing existing crimes like vandalism or
harassment more severely if prosecutors can show that racial, religious, or
96. See generally R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 397 (White, J., concurring).
97. Justices White, Blackman, and O'Connor concurred with Justice Stevens joining in
part.
98. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 398, 415 (White, J., concurring). The Court's "decision is an
arid, doctrinaire interpretation, driven by the frequently irresistible impulse of judges to tinker
with the First Amendment. The decision is mischievous at best and will surely confuse the
lower courts. I join the judgment, but not the folly of the opinion." Id.
99. Id. at 397.
100. Id. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
101. Id.
102. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 414. Justice Scalia's concern that lawmakers may not regulate
some fighting words more strictly than others might conceivably have been ameliorated had
St. Paul merely added to its ordinance a catch-all phrase such as "'and all other fighting words
that may constitutionally be subject to this ordinance. "' Id. at 402.
103. One journalist comments:
With the desire to punish racist intimidation colliding with free speech
Some
concerns, the case split groups that are normally allied.
organizations-the Anti-Defamation League, the NAACP and People for
the American Way-supported the law's constitutionality; others,
including the American Civil Liberties Union and the American Jewish
Congress, argued against it.
Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Overturns Law BarringHate Crimes; Free Speech Ruling Seen
as FarReaching, WASH. POST, June 23, 1992, at Al.
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gender bias was a factor in the underlying crime. Marc Stem of the
American Jewish Congress told The Washington Post "that the penaltyenhancement statutes are 'very doubtful after today .... If you enhance for
race and not for sexual orientation, you have the
1°4 same content basis you have
here"' that invalidated the St. Paul ordinance.
The answer to many of these questions would come soon enough. A
year later, in 1993, the Court considered the case of Wisconsin v.
Mitchell. °5 Todd Mitchell was convicted of aggravated battery in
Wisconsin, where the offense ordinarily carries a maximum sentence of two
years imprisonment.1' 6 But because the jury found that Mitchell had
intentionally selected his victim because of race, the maximum sentence for
Mitchell's offense was more than tripled to seven years under the state's
enhancement statute. 1°7 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's
decision in R.A.V., the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the enhanced
sentence, holding that the Wisconsin statute "violates the First Amendment
directly by punishing what the legislature has deemed to be offensive
thought."1° The Unites States Supreme Court reversed, thus reinstating
Wisconsin's law and Mitchell's seven-year sentence. 1' 9 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that sentencing judges have traditionally considered a wide
variety of factors in addition to evidence bearing solely on guilt. 10 While a
judge may not take into consideration a defendant's abstract beliefs, however
obnoxious to most people, the Court concluded that the Constitution "does
not erect a per se barrier to the admission of evidence concerning one's
beliefs and associations ... simply because those beliefs and associations are
protected by the First Amendment.""' The unanimous decision was devoid
of the stormy rhetoric found in the RA.V. case.

104. Id.
105. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
106. Id. at 480 (citing Wis.

STAT.

§ 940.19(2) (1997) (effective 1993) and

§ 939.50(3)(e) (1997)).
107. Wis. STAT. § 939.645(1)(b) (1997) (effective May 3, 1988) (enhancing the
maximum penalty for an offense whenever the defendant "[i]ntentionally selects the person
against whom the crime... is committed... because of the.., race, religion, color,
disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person").
108. Mitchell, 508 U.S. at 481-82 (quoting State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 811
(1992)).
109 Id. at 483.
110. Id. at 485.
111. Id. at 486.
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VI. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS
Other than Brown v. Board of Education,112 which is now universally
accepted, no other Supreme Court decision has generated more controversy
than the landmark abortion ruling in Roe v. Wade.' 13 The Roe decision
remains the focal point of heated debate throughout the country. In 1992,
the Court was within one vote of overruling Roe in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey.114 Justice Kennedy, a Reagan appointee upon whom many had
counted to provide a fifth vote to overrule Roe, instead provided the fifth
vote to reaffirm the decision. Justice White, one of the two dissenters in
Roe, l5 subsequently departed from the Court, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
widely believed to be pro-choice, was appointed to his seat. The right to
choose an abortion appears to be more secure today than at any point in the
preceding decade, at least in the United States Supreme Court. But having
lost in the courts, anti-abortionists have increasingly taken their cause to the
streets and directly to the front doors of abortion clinics. In many cases, the
message has not been subtle: the purpose of their presence was to prevent
women from obtaining abortions. 16
In 1994, the Supreme Court sought to balance the right to choose an
abortion against the right to speak in Madsen v. Women's Health Center,
Inc.117 Two years earlier, anti-abortion activists had staged a series of
demonstrations at the Women's Health Center in Melbourne, Florida. 8
Upon finding that access to the clinic was being impeded and potential
patients were being discouraged from entering, a Florida state judge issued
an injunction directed at the protesters. 19 The injuction created buffer zones
that protesters could not enter, noise restrictions during hours when the
clinic might be providing abortions or abortion related services, and other

112. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
115. The other dissenter was Justice Rehnquist, then an Associate Justice, and, at the
time of this writing, the only Justice still on the Court to have participated in the Roe decision.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 171.
116. Since the Court's decision in PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992),
there have been at least four fatal acts of violence at U.S. abortion clinics: in Pensacola,
Florida, March 10, 1993, and again on July 29, 1994, in Pensacola; in Brookline,
Massachusetts on December 30, 1994; and in Birmingham, Alabama on January 29, 1998.
From Associated Press news reports.
117. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
118. Id. at 758.
119. Id.
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restrictions. 12° Abortion opponents argued that the noise restrictions violated
their right to free speech.1
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court upheld most of the
injunctive measures but also took special note of the free speech rights of
demonstrators.'2 The Court said that "standard time, place, and manner
analysis is not sufficiently rigorous" for evaluating content-neutral
injunctions that restrict speech; instead, the test is "whether the challenged
provisions... burden' no more speech than necessary to serve a significant
government interest. 23
It would take three years to determine what these words in Madsen
actually meant. The case, Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network,124 involved a
network of abortion clinics in upstate New York that the Court found had
been under siege by anti-abortion activists.1 5 "[T]he clinics were subjected
to numerous large-scale blockades in which protesters would march, stand,
kneel, sit, or lie in [clinic] parking lot driveways and doorways," blocking or
hindering cars from entering the lots, and hindering both patients and clinic
employees from entering the clinics. 26 In addition, smaller groups of
protesters consistently attempted to stop or disrupt clinic operations by,
among other things, milling around clinic doorways and driveway entrances,
trespassing onto clinic parking lots, crowding around cars, and surrounding,
crowding, jostling, grabbing, pushing, shoving, yelling, and spitting at
women and their escorts entering the clinics.! 2 Outside the clinics, antiabortion protesters called "sidewalk counselors" used similar methods in
attempting to dissuade women headed toward the clinics from having
2 The local police were ineffective in responding to the
abortions.
1 29
protests.
The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later, after
the protests and sidewalk counseling continued, a preliminary injunction
order.130 The injuction banned "demonstrating... within fifteen feet...
of... doorways or doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and
driveway entrances of [clinic] facilities," ("fixed buffer zones") similar to
120. Id. at 759-61 (citing Operation Rescue v. Woman's Health Ctr., 626 So. 2d 644,
679-80 (Fla. 1993)).
121. Id. at 761.
122. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 793.
123. Id. at 765.
124. 117 S. Ct. 855 (1997).

125. Id. at 860.
126. Id.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 860.
130. Id. at 861.
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those allowed in Madsen, or "within fifteen feet of any person or vehicle
seeking access to or leaving such facilities" ("floating buffer zones").3 1
Again, it was Chief Justice Rehnquist who wrote the Court's majority
opinion and, applying Madsen, upheld the fixed buffer zone but struck down
the floating zone. 132 Chief Justice Rehnquist was troubled by the fact that
the floating buffer zones prevented demonstrators from communicating a
message from a normal conversational distance or handing leaflets to people
on the public sidewalks who were entering or leaving the clinics. 13 3 Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
This is a broad prohibition, both because of the type of speech that
is restricted and the nature of the location. Leafletting and
commenting on matters of public concern are classic forms of
speech that lie at the heart of the First Amendment, and speech in
public areas is at its most protected on public
134 sidewalks, a
prototypical example of a traditional public forum.
There was something in the decision for everyone, and abortion rights
advocates as well as the foes, were all quick to declare victory. 13 5 But, it was
a compromise ruling with freedom of speech emerging as the larger winner.
The Los Angeles Times called the decision an important victory for "[flree
speech of the loud, aggressive, in-your-face variety... one that could shape
future sidewalk confrontations on matters ranging from animal rights and
union picketing to street beggars and celebrity photographers. 1 36
VII. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE PROFITS OF CRIME

When asked to analyze a Supreme Court ruling giving extraterritorial
effect to a law bashing the Philippines, the sagacious but fictitious Chicago
saloon keeper, Mr. Dooley, 37 issued in Irish dialect his often quoted
131. Id. at 862 (quoting Pro-Choice Network v. Project Rescue W. N.Y., 799 F. Supp.

1417, 1440-41 (W.D.N.Y. 1992)).
132. Id. at 866-67.
133. Id. at 867.
134. Schenck, 117 S. Ct. at 867.
135. See Joan Biskupic, Court Backs Capital Fixed 15-Foot Buffer Zone at Clinics;
Justices Condemn Some Antiabortion Tactics in Ruling that Reinforces a 1994 Decision,
WASH. POST, February 20, 1997, at A18; Linda Greenhouse, High Court Upholds 15-Foot
CapitalBuffer Zone at Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, February 20, 1997, at Al.
136. David Savage, 'In-Your-Face' Speech Wins in Supreme Court, L.A. TMES,
February 22, 1997, at Al.
137. Peter Finley Dunne, a famous turn-of-the-century political commentator in
Chicago, wrote under the pseudonym of "Mr. Dooley."
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reply: "No matter whether the Constitution follows the flag or not, the
Supreme Court follows the 'iliction returns."' In a narrow sense, Mr.
Dooley may be correct for Supreme Court Justices, like all Article IHjudges,
must be nominated by the elected President and confirmed by elected
senators. 13 Those who reach the Supreme Court bench are a function of,
and naturally follow from, those who reach the White House and the Senate.
Mr. Dooley, however, is incorrect in every other respect. Once given the
nod, federal judges serve for life and, unlike elected representatives, have the
unique freedom to insulate themselves from popular opinion. The wisdom
of this arrangement becomes particularly evident in matters of free speech
where the Justices, with some consistency, reach decisions that are at least
"arguably" faithful to the Constitution but clearly at odds with current public
sentiment. Mr. Dooley might appreciate how the Supreme Court balanced
New York's "Son of Sam" law with freedom of speech in Simon
& Schuster,
139
Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board.
During the summer of 1977, David Berkowitz was identified as the
serial killer known as the "Son of Sam." After his arrest, Berkowitz was
offered a large sum of money for the rights to his story. However, the New
York legislature quickly acted to prevent such compensation since the
families of the victims remained uncompensated.1 40
The legislature enacted a statute intended to "ensure that monies
received by the criminal under such circumstances shall first be made
available to recompense the victims of that crime for their loss and
suffering."' 42 The measure had overwhelming support. The author of the
statute explained: "It is abhorrent to one's sense of justice and decency that
an individual.., can expect to receive large sums of money for his story
once he is captured-while five people
are dead, [and] other people were
143
injured as a result of his conduct."'
New York's "Son of Sam" law as amended required that an accused or
convicted criminal's income, from works describing his crime, be deposited
in an escrow account held by the state Crime Victims Board and ultimately
made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal's other
creditors. 44 The law was seldom applied and, in 1986, the "Son of Sam"
138. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
139. 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
140. Id. at 108.

141. N.Y. [law] § 632-(a)(1) (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1991).
142. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 108 (citing to N.Y. [law] § 632(a)(1) (McKinney
1982 & Supp. 1991)).
143. Id. (quoting Senator Emanuel R. Gold), reprinted in N.Y. LEGisL.rrv ANN. 267

(1997).
144. Id. at 111. "Ironically, the statute was never even applied to the Son of Sam
himself; David Berkowitz was found incompetent to stand trial, and the statute applied only to
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law was challenged on free speech grounds by Simon & Schuster,
Incorporated, a publishing house. r45 Simon & Schuster had entered into a
contract with Henry Hill, a mid-level foot soldier in one of New York's
Mafia families from 1955 to 19802 46 Hill, who had engineered some of the
most daring crimes of his day, including the theft of $6 million from
Lufthansa Airlines in 1978, was arrested in 1980 on extortion, narcotics, and
a variety of other charges.1 47 In exchange for immunity from prosecution, he
testified against many of his former colleagues.' 48 Collaborating with author
Nicholas Pileggi, Hill produced a book, Wiseguy: Life in a Mafia Family,
which depicts "in colorful detail, the day-to-day existence of organized
crime. 1 49 The book was a phenomenal success-with more than a million
copies in print within nineteen months of its publication. 150 A few years
later, Wiseguy was converted into a feature length film called Goodfellas,
which won a host of awards as the best film of 1990.151
While the notoriety may have created a windfall for Simon & Schuster,
it also brought the attention of the Crime Victims Board.152 The Board
notified Simon & Schuster that under New York's "Son of Sam" law the
Board was entitled to any monies due to Hill.153 In the ensuing litigation,
Simon & Schuster argued that the state's law, by now duplicated in forty
states and the federal government, 154 was inconsistent with the First
Amendment.155

criminals who had actually been convicted." Id. (citing to Dennis Hevesi, Cases Under
"Sam" Law: Notorious but Few, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 20, 1991, at B8). Berkowitz did assist in
the writing of his story but, according to the Crime Victims Board, voluntarily paid his share
of the royalties from the book SON OF SAM published in 1981 to his victims or their estates.

Id.
145. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 105.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 114.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 123.
155. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115. The federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3681 (1997)
(effective Oct. 12, 1984), was passed, with strong bipartisan support, as part of the Victims of
Crime Act of 1984 after more than a decade of congressional debate regarding the need for the
federal government to provide compensation and assistance to the victims of crime. Victims of
Crime Act of 1984, Title II, ch. XIV, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1406(a) (1984).
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The Justice Department entered the case, amicus curiae, on the side of
New York and in defense of the federal statute which had been placed in
jeopardy by the case.1s6 Government lawyers argued:
Statutes limiting the profits criminals receive from expressive
works that describe their crimes substantially further government
interests of the highest order... The spectacle of criminals
profiting from books or movies recounting their unlawful actions
understandably and appropriately is perceived as agravating the
harm already inflicted on the victims of those actions.
The government's brief also quoted from the testimony of a former
Congressman before the Senate Judiciary Committee while the Committee
was considering enacting a law similar to the one in New York: "There is
a criminal
something basically wrong about a system of justice which allows
158
to profit from his crime while his victims continue to suffer.
The Supreme Court, however, saw the issue quite differently. Justice
Sandra O'Connor, writing for the Court, did acknowledge that "the State has
a compelling interest in ensuring that victims of crime are compensated by
those who harm them"'159 and "an undisputed comjpelling interest in ensuring
that criminals do not profit from their crimes," 6 but O'Connor concluded
the law was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's compelling
interest. 6 1 As evidence of its "overinclusiveness," O'Connor suggested that
the law could have been invoked to confiscate the proceeds of Civil
Disobedience,162 where Henry David Thoreau acknowledged his refusal to
pay taxes, and even The Confessions of Saint Augustine,16 where the author
laments "'my past foulness and the carnal corruptions of my soul,' one
pears from a neighboring
instance of
6 which involved the theft of
vineyard.'
156. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members
of the N.Y. St. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1990) (No. 90-1059)."
157. Id. at 6.
158. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 1984: Hearingson S. 2423 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984) (statement of M. Butler,
constitutional expert).
159. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 118.
160. Id. at 119.
161. Id. at 123.
162. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND ON THE DUTY OF CIvIL DISOBEDIENCE (New
American Library 1960) (1849).
163. AuGusINE SAINT BISHOP OF HIPO, THE CONFESSIONS OF SAnrr AUGUSTINE (J.G.
Pilldngton trans., Heritage Press 1963).
164. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 121 (quoting AUGUSTINE, supra note 163).
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Only Justice Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, objected to the
use of the "compelling state interest" test, which derives from the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence. 165 Justice Kennedy said the law should be
rejected solely on the ground that it was a regulation based on content which
has the full protection of the First Amendment. 166 "[R]esort to the
[compelling state interest] test,"1 67 warned Justice Kennedy, "might be read
as a concession that [s]tates may censor speech whenever they believe there
is a compelling justification for doing so. Our precedents and traditions
allow no such inference."1 68 Justice Kennedy's point on the appropriate test
is all but certain to be revisited in future free speech clashes before the high
Court.
The Court's decision in the Simon & Schuster case did not prevent Hill
or any other criminals from being sued by those they may have hurt, but it
prohibited states from singlinq out profits from books or movies to be set
aside for the victims' benefit. 69 New York had the support of dozens of
other states, the Justice Department, and at least half a dozen victims' rights
groups.170 Two lower courts and the New York Court of Appeals, 171 the
state's highest court, had all upheld the "Son of Sam" law. 7 2 The United
States Supreme Court was surely not following any election returns when it
rejected it as a violation
of free speech.173 And at least on the Court, there
74
dissents.
were no

Vi.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND POLITICAL PATRONAGE

More than a hundred years ago, Justice Holmes, in his famous dictum,
said a policeman "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
165. Id. at 124 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
166. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 124.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 124-25.
169. Id. at 109.
170. Id. at 115.
171. On May 7, 1991, the New York State Court of Appeals, by unanimous vote, ruled
that convicted murderer Jean Harris was not entitled to, and could not assign to others,
royalties from her best-selling book STRANGER IN Two WORLDS. Children of Bedford, Inc. v.
Petromelis, 573 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1991), vacated, 502 U.S. 1025 (1992).
172. Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115.
173. Id. at 107.
174. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia, and Souter joined. Justices Blackmun and
Kennedy filed opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas, who did not join the
Court until eight days after the case was argued, did not participate. Id. at 123-24.
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no constitutional right to be a policeman." 175 The Burger Court had come a
long way in modifying, if not outright rejecting, that idea. The Court has
held, in effect, that while there may be no constitutional right to be a
of
policeman, the government has no right to condition the employment
76
police officers or any other civil servants on what they say or believe.
The Rehnquist Court has not only embraced Elrod v. Burns 177 ' and
Branti v. Finkel,178 it has expanded on them, extending their free speech
protections from government employees to those who merely apply for
government work.
The four dissenters in Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois,180 led by Justice Scalia, argued that "the desirability of patronage is
a policy question to be decided by the people's representatives ' 181 and "a
political question if there ever was one."'182 The dissenters were convinced
that Elrod and Branti were "not only wrong, not only recent, not only
contradicted by a long prior tradition, but also ... unworkable in practice"
and therefore "should be overruled." 183
Notwithstanding that Rutan was decided by the thinnest of margins over
the most impassioned dissent, the Rehnquist Court chose to enlarge upon the
decision rather than retreat by dealing, what dissenting Justices considered, a
body blow to political patronage as we have known it. The latest conflict
arose in two cases in 1996, Board of County Commissioners, Wabaunsee
County, Kansas v. Umbehr184 and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake.'85
Umbehr involved an independent contractor, Keen Umbehr, who
contracted with the Wabaunsee County Board of Commissioners "for him to
be the exclusive hauler of trash for cities in the county.' ' 186 But "[d]uring the
term of his contract, Umbehr was an outspoken critic" of the Board who
voiced his criticisms at the Board's meetings and in letters and editorials in
local newspapers. 187 Umbehr's allegations that the Board was in the habit of
violating the state's Open Meetings Act "were vindicated in a consent decree
175. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
176. See, e.g., Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507

(1980).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

427 U.S. 347 (1976).
445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Rutan v. Republican Party of 111., 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 104 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 114.
Id. at 110-11.
116 S. Ct. 2342 (1996).
116 S. Ct. 2353 (1996).
186. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
187. Id.
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signed by the Board's members. 188 In addition, "Umbehr also ran
unsuccessfully for election to the Board." 189
Board members "allegedly took Umbehr's criticism badly," voting 2-1
to terminate his exclusive contract with the County. 19° Umbehr sued the two
majority Board members under chapter 42 of the United States Code section
1983,191 claiming that the termination of his government
contract was in
92
retaliation to his criticism of the County and the Board.'
The O'Hare Truck Service case raised similar questions about the
practice of elected politicians favoring their friends and disfavoring their
enemies.193 John Gratziana owned and operated O'Hare Truck Service. The
company was among those called from time to time by the City of Northlake,
Illinois to perform towing services. Shortly after Gratziana refused to
contribute to the incumbent mayor's reelection campaign and sided openly
with his opponent, Gratziana was removed from the list of those towing
companies to be called. 194 Consequently, Gratziana sued the City under
chapter 42 of the United States Code section 1983, claiming infringement of
his First Amendment rights. 195
Both Umbehr and Gratziana did work "for" the government, but neither
were employees "of' the government.
They were independent
contractors.1 96 The Court found the distinction constitutionally insignificant
and went on to extend Rutan's First Amendment protection for job
"applicants" to independent contractors. 197 Both the Umbehr case1 98 and the
O'Harecase 199 were decided by a lopsided 7-2 votes, with Justices Scalia
and Thomas in dissent. This was no small matter to Justice Scalia who, in
one of his most memorable, and passionate dissents, characterized the
decisions as a twin assault on the American political system itself.
Justice Scalia stated:
They say hard cases make bad law. The cases before the Court
today set the blood boiling, with the arrogance that they seem to
display on the part of elected officials ....
For every extreme case
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2345.
Id. at 2345-46.
O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2355.
Id. at 2353-54.
Id.
Id.
See Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2350; O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2360.
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
O'Hare, 116 S. Ct. at 2361 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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of the sort alleged here, I expect there are thousands of contracts
awarded on a "favoritism" basis that no one would get excited
about. The Democratic mayor gives the city's municipal bond
business to what is known to be a solid Democratic law firmtaking it away from the solid Republican law firm that had the
business during the previous, Republican, administration. What
else is new?... Hooray! Favoritism such as this happens all the
time in American political life, and no one has ever thought that it
violated-of all things-the First Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States.
The Court must be living in another world. Day by day, case by
case, it is busy designing a Constitution for a country I do not
recognize. Depending upon which of today's cases one chooses to
consider authoritative, it has either (O'Hare) thrown out vast
numbers of practices that are routine in American political life in
order to get rid of a few bad apples; or (Umbehr) with the same
purpose in mind subjected those routine practices to endless,
uncertain, case-by-case, balance-all-the-factors, and-who-knowswho-will-win litigation.
20 0
I dissent.
Allowing those in power to award benefits and privileges to their
friends and supporters has been sanctioned by history.20 1 But Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court in Umbehr, and Justice Kennedy, writing
for the Court in O'Hare, both felt existing precedents were sufficient to
balance the interest of patronage with the right to free speech.2
Both
decisions rely heavily on Pickeringv. Board of Education of Township High
School District 205. Originally applicable only to government employees,
Pickering held that the interests of the [employee] "as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern" be balanced "against the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."0 While the decisions in
Umbehr and O'Hare clearly extend First Amendment protection to
independent contractors, they leave open the possibility they may not be
entitled to quite the same "degree" of protection as government employees.
In the broader context, however, Umbehr and O'Hare reinforce the
perception that the Rehnquist Court views the First Amendment right to free
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 2373-74 (Scalia, L,dissenting.).
Elrod,427 U.S. at 377-78 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. at 2347; O'HareTruck Serv., 116 S.Ct. at 2356.
391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Id. at 568.
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speech broadly. Reasonable minds can disagree over whether this is an
auspicious development. Some, such as Justice Scalia in the patronage
cases, would seem to believe the Court has been overprotective of speech or
expressive activity at the expense of other rights and interests. I leave it to
the reader to draw an independent conclusion.
The Rehnquist Court, however, does not speak with one voice on any
single issue; it is, after all, a collegial body. Nor has the Rehnquist Court
been uniform in its approach to freedom of speech. Freedom of speech does
not always carry the day. The Court, for example, had expressed concern
over whether the federal government had a sufficiently substantial interest in
requiring local cable television operators to carry the programming of local
broadcasters. 5 In 1997, the Court concluded that it did, and thus the
Federal Communication Commission "must carry" rule faced no First
Amendment impediment. 20 6 Similarly, the Court found no First Amendment
violation when Florida required its lawyers to wait until thirty days after an
accident or disaster before contacting victims or their relatives.
Despite
powerful arguments and advocacy to the contrary, the Court concluded the
state's interest in discouraging "ambulance chasing" by its lawyers
outweighed any free speech concerns. 2 8 The Rehnquist Court reaffirmed
that freedom of speech is susceptible to time, place, and manner restrictions
in Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 9 allowing New York City to require those
desiring to stage rock concerts in Central Park to rent a city-owned sound
system, a requirement the Court justified by the New York's interest in
controlling noise in a public park.2 0 In Frisby v. Schultz, 21' the Court found
no First Amendment violation in communities which banned picketing of
private dwellings.2 12 The Court has consistently tolerated a diminished First
Amendment right for students in public schools, ruling that their newspapers
are subject to censorship by school officials 21 3 and that students may be
disciplined for using gross sexual innuendo in a student assembly speech
without violating the First Amendment. 1 4
205. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997).
206. Id. at 1203.
207. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995).
208. Id. at 628.
209. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
210. Id. at 803.
211. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
212. Id. at 488.
213. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 276 (1988).
214. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); see also Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (upholding the First
Amendment right of high school students to wear black armbands to protest the Vietnam war,
cited with approval in Hazelwood and Bethel).
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The Court's approach to commercial speech has been somewhat
schizophrenic. In 1996, the Court rejected, on free speech grounds, Rhode
Island's ban on liquor price advertising in a decision that cast doubt on
efforts by the Clinton administration to sharply restrict cigarette
advertising.2 15 The following year, however, the Court, divided 5-4, found
no First Amendment obstacle in the government requiring agricultural
producers to pay for generic advertising to promote their products,
notwithstanding their belief that the advertising
216- was unwanted, unnecessary,
and may have even been misleading or false.
However, the defeats for freedom of speech in the Rehnquist Court
have been truly dwarfed by the victories.217 Although there may be shifting
majorities and close votes, there can be little doubt as to where the Court is
generally going in this area. And on the thorniest, most explosive case, those
cases that divide lower court judges, lawyers, law students, and lay persons
alike, there has been a consistent majority at the Supreme Court on the side
of a broad right to free speech.

215. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996). The decision

cast doubt on the viability of Posadasde P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328
(1986).
216. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1997).
217. See, e.g., Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Elections
Comm'n, 116 S. Ct. 2309, 2314-15 (1996) (rejecting federal limits on "uncoordinated"
expenditures by political parties on behalf of candidates as inconsistent with the First
Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Election Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (rejecting
Ohio's prohibition on the anonymous distribution of campaign literature); United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995) (rejecting, on free speech
grounds, a federal ban on government employees accepting honoraria for speeches, writings,
etc.); City of LaDue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58-59 (1994) (rejecting a municipal ordinance
banning the posting of signs in residential neighborhoods in order to reduce "visual clutter");
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 431 (1993) (rejecting a
municipal ordinance banning distribution of "commercial handbills" via news racks otherwise
permitted on public property); Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123, 137 (1992) (linking parade permit fees to anticipated costs to the county rejected as
content-based violation of free speech); The Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989)
(stating one may not criminalize truthful publication of the names of rape victims obtained
from public records); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding no libel
action for transparently fictitious satire of public figure); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (holding that the burden is on libel plaintiff to prove
allegedly libelous news report are false rather than on defendant to prove accuracy or absence
of malice).
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